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KIMEL AND GARRETT: ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE
COURT UNDERVALUING INDIVIDUAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND SETTLED EXPECTATIONS
Julie M. Spanbauer*
The most marked trait of present life, economically speaking, is
insecurity .... Insecurity cuts deeper and extends more widely than
bare unemployment. Fear of loss of work, dread of the oncoming of
old age, create anxiety and eat into self-respect in a way that impairs
personal dignity.
Where fears abound, courageous and robust
individuality is undermined.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Several recent United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Eleventh Amendment have had a dramatic impact upon the protection afforded
state employees under federal employment discrimination law. Two key
decisions, issued in 2000 and 2001, drastically restricted the rights of state
employees. First, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 2 the Court ruled that
3
when Congress extended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
to states in 1974, it lacked the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 4 This ruling precludes individual state employees from
suing their state employers for damages under the ADEA 5 A year later, the
Court applied this same analysis in Board of Trustees v. Garrett,6 to invalidate
7
similar claims under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
In its most recent pronouncement on this issue, however, a closely divided
Court ruled differently. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,8
the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude private claims for
damages made by state employees against their employers under the Family and
. Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. I thank Susan
Marie Connor,
Professor, The John Marshall Law School, for her insights and guidance as this piece was being
written, and Patricia Scott, Reference Librarian, The John Marshall Law School, for her tireless efforts
on my behalf.
1. JOHN DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW 54-55 (1930). See Charles A. Reich, The
Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1410 n.3 (1991) (noting that this personal liberty and

sovereignty was not extended to all people prior to Fourteenth Amendment).
2. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2001).
4. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 68, 91-92.

5. Id. at 91.
6. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
7. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-64 (invalidating claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2001)).
8. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).

HeinOnline -- 76 Temp. L. Rev. 787 2003

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). 9 The Court found significant the fact that
the claim under the FMLA implicated gender as the protected class and thus
required an intermediate level of scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment as
opposed to the minimal scrutiny afforded age and disability-based claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment-the rational basis standard. 10 Thus, the Supreme
Court has not entirely eviscerated the protection state employees enjoy under
federal employment discrimination law.
It should also be noted that Kimel and Garretthave not entirely foreclosed
ADEA and ADA claims by state employees against their employers. First, state
employees are not precluded from pursuing ADEA or ADA claims against their
employers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.1
Second, the
Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit those employed by municipalities and
local governments from pursuing damage claims under these laws. 12 Third, the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) from intervening and pursuing litigation.' 3 Finally,
claimants can seek to bring their federal age and disability discrimination claims
in state courts, but only if the state has waived sovereign immunity for federal
claims in state court.

14

The problem presented by these alternatives is their inherent limitations.
First, injunctive relief cannot make a victim of discrimination whole in the way

that a remedy can when it includes both injunctive and monetary relief.,5
9. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976-78, 1984 (holding that Eleventh Amendment did not preclude
damages claims made by state employees against their employers under 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(1994)).
10. Id. at 1978,1981.
11. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756-57 (1999) (explaining some limitations of sovereign
immunity). The United States Supreme Court first recognized this right in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 166 (1908). See Brent W. Landau, Note, State Employees and Sovereign Immunity: Alternatives
and Strategies for Enforcing FederalEmployment Laws, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 197 & nn.226-28
(2002). It should also be noted that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suits for damages
against state officials in their individual capacity, which means that the relief must be sought from the
official personally and the discriminatory conduct must be that of the individual. See Evelyn Corwin
McCafferty, Comment, Age Discriminationand Sovereign Immunity: Does Kimel Signal the End of the
Line for Alabama's State Employees?, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1057, 1071 (2001). There are obvious
limitations with this strategy: the individual may not have financial resources to pay a judgment and
may not even qualify as a proper defendant under the discrimination statutes. Id.
12. "In Alden v. Maine, the Court recently reaffirmed that a core principle of the sovereign
immunity doctrine 'is that it bars suits against States but not lesser entities. The immunity does not
extend to suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity which is not
an arm of the state."' Ivan E. Bodensteiner & Rosalie B. Levinson, Litigating Age and Disability
Claims Against State Government Employers in the New "Federalism" Era, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 99, 102 (2001) (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 756).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (2001). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar lawsuits by the
EEOC under both the ADEA and the ADA; these actions remain feasible. See Bodensteiner &
Levinson, supra note 12, at 120 & n.95 (discussing ability and authority of EEOC to bring actions to
protect individuals from employment discrimination).
14. See infra note 18 for discussion of different waiver arguments.
15. In fact, when damage remedies were made available via the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Congress explicitly declared:
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Second, the fact that some governmental employees continue to be protected
under these laws does not negate the fact that others are not. Collectively, the
states employ more than 4.8 million people who are now without meaningful
protection under these laws. 16 It is also unlikely that many claimants' interests
will be pursued by the EEOC. This problem is not of constitutional dimension,
EEOC has limited resources. 17 As to waiver, it
but is a pragmatic concern-the
18
has generally not occurred.
Strengthening Title VII's remedial scheme to provide monetary damages for intentional
gender and religious discrimination is necessary to conform remedies for intentional gender
and religious discrimination to those currently available to victims of intentional race
discrimination. Monetarty [sic] damages also are necessary to make discrimination victims
whole for the terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional health, and to
their self-respect and dignity. Such relief is also necessary to encourage citizens to act as
private attorneys general to enforce the statute. Monetary damages simply raise the cost of
an employer's engaging in intentional discrimination, thereby providing employers with
additional incentives to prevent intentional discrimination in the workplace before it
happens.
Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science Research on
Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment,7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273. 336
(2001) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 64-65 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,602-03).
16. See Landau, supra note 11, at 171 (discussing similarities and differences of public employees
as compared to private employees, but noting that there are disputes between employer and employee
in both sectors).
17. "As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent in Alden v. Maine, it is unrealistic to assume that
the federal government, by bringing suit itself, can adequately provide redress for violations of the
Constitution and federal law, 'unless Congress plans a significant expansion of the National
Government's litigating forces."' See McCafferty, supra note 11, at 1068 (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at
810 (Souter, J., dissenting)) (footnotes omitted) (discussing shortfall of government resources to
litigate all of potential ADEA violations and further difficulties in providing damage rewards to state
employees). It should be noted that the EEOC has approved a National Enforcement Plan by which it
attempts to effectively utilize its admittedly limited resources for pursuing or intervening in litigation,
but EEOC litigation statistics for 2002 support Justice Souter's statement. For example, the EEOC
either filed suit, intervened, petitioned for preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining orders, or
subpoenaed information relevant to discrimination charges in 364 of all employment discrimination
litigation. See EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1992 through FY 2002, availableat http://www.eeoc.gov/
stats/litigation.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) (comparing break-down of employment discrimination
lawsuits filed by the EEOC under various statutes from FY 1992 through FY 2002). Of these 364
lawsuits, forty-one represented claims pursued by the EEOC under the ADA and twenty-nine
represented claims under the ADEA. Id.
18. "It is unlikely that these states would decide in the future to voluntarily consent to suits under
the ADEA [and ADA] after claiming that they are immune under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity." McCafferty, supra note 11, at 1066. In fact, since the Supreme Court decision in Garrett,
only two states, Minnesota and North Carolina, have waived their sovereign immunity and
consented to be sued in federal court pursuant to federal civil rights statutes. A bill,
however, was recently introduced in the Illinois House of Representatives that would waive
the state's sovereign immunity under the ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and FLSA. The majority
Leader of the Illinois House has indicated that the bill will be amended to include a
provision permitting suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Similar efforts have
failed in four other states.
Joseph J. Shelton, Comment, In the Wake of Garrett: State Law Alternatives to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 837, 847-48 (2003) (footnotes omitted). Constructive waiver
arguments appear to be foreclosed by the recent Supreme Court decision in Florida Prepaid
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Kimel and Garrettare momentous decisions not only because they arguably
reflect "fundamental changes in American constitutional law," 19 but also because
they involve two important, frequently invoked pieces of federal legislation. The
ADA, which was enacted in 1990, has been described as the single "most
sweeping piece" of federal employment discrimination legislation since the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.20 The ADEA, originally enacted in 1967, has become
increasingly important to an aging workforce. In fact, federal age and disability
discrimination claims currently rank third and fourth, respectively, in terms of
the total number of charges filed with the EEOC. 21 Together, charges of age and
disability discrimination represent 42.5%, nearly one-half, of all charges of
discrimination filed with the EEOC. 22 Although claims against state employers
comprise only a small proportion of these figures, state employees are now
treated differently under federal law than are other employees, such as those
employed in the private sector, and state employees are now without the
protections many had come to expect. Indeed, for some of the younger workers,
federal age discrimination laws have been in existence since before they were
born.
In Part II, this Article will provide a brief history of discrimination in this
country followed by a discussion of the modern history of employment

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 682-83 (1999). See also GTE N.,
Inc. v. Strand, 209 F.3d 909, 922 n.6 (6th Cir. 2000) (commenting that waiver argument no longer
viable); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2000) (referencing earlier decision of
Sixth Circuit holding implied waiver theory no longer viable). But see Erickson v. Bd. of Governors,
207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding implied waiver of sovereign immunity under ADA because
Illinois has "opened its courts to claims based on state law, including its own prohibition of disability
discrimination by units of state government"). See generally Stephanie Chapman, Note, Constitutional
Law: MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Public Service Commission: The Tenth Circuit Rebuffs the
Supreme Court Trend Supporting State Immunity, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 175 (2002) (discussing potential

impact of recent decisions finding waiver of immunity due to adherence to Telecommunications Act
regulatory scheme). See also McCafferty, supra note 11, at 1066-69 for a discussion of other waiver
arguments, which are also likely to be unsuccessful.
19. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1045, 1045 (2001). These decisions may also reflect a likelihood of more change on the horizon.
Some argue that provisions of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act may also suffer a
similar fate. Shelton, supra note 18, at 839 & n.22-23. See also Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal
Civil Rights Against Public Entities After Garrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41, 82-83 (2001) (discussing potential

effect of Garrett on future federal legislation regarding employment discrimination claims by public
employees).
20. Tim Edwards, Constitutional Limits on an Employer's Right to Dictate the Terms of an
Addict's Recovery Under the ADA: Some Sobering Concerns, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1679, 1696 & n.81

(1999) (quoting 135 Cong. Rec. S10, 714 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch)). See also
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, at xiii (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A.
Beyer eds., 1993) (noting significance of ADA and how it provides support to already existing
disability law).
21. Martha Neil, Drawing the Line, 88 A.B.A. J., May 2002, at 38,40.
22. A total of 41.9% of ADEA and ADA charges were filed in 2001. Id. See EEOC Charge
Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 2002, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2004) (summarizing number and type of individual charge filings by individuals from FY 1992
through FY 2002).
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discrimination law, the latter of which will include a discussion of the somewhat
parallel development of federal and state law in this arena and an analysis of the
expansion of federal law over time. 23 Within this framework, the more recent
history of the ADA and the ADEA will also be examined. 24 This discussion will
be followed in Part III by an analysis of the constitutional challenges made to
federal employment discrimination legislation, including the Supreme Court's
more recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and its effect in abruptly
contracting two key pieces of federal employment discrimination law.2 5 Next, in
Part IV, this article will examine the rights/powers distinction in constitutional
analysis, the role of the state as employer, the changing status of work in this
country, and Supreme Court decisions in which the settled expectations of
individuals have played a part in the Court's decision not to overrule
precedent. 26 I will argue that the settled expectations of individuals should not
23. See infra notes 28-172 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of
discrimination law beginning with state legislation law and expanding through federal legislation
particularly providing protection in the areas of race, age, and disability. In terms of providing a brief
history of discrimination in this country, the discussion will be focused on race discrimination because
eradication of it was the immediate and urgent purpose underlying the enactment of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See infra note 32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the roots of
employment discrimination against African Americans beginning with the importation of Africans as
slaves. The purpose underlying Title VII, however, was also to create "a congressionally declared
national policy of nondiscrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in matters of
promotion and employment." Leah C. Myers, Disability Harassment: How Far Should the ADA
Follow in the Footsteps of Title VII?, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 265, 267 & n.16 (2003) (quoting U.S. Equal
Emp. Opp. Comm'n, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3119 (1968)).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(d) (2001) (prohibiting unfair employment practices by employers,
employment agencies, and labor organizations, or through training programs with regard to race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin). For a discussion of the history of discrimination and meaning
of these four other protected classes under Title VII, see Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker
Shade of Pale, in Symposium: Race and the Law at the Turn of the Century, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705,

1734 & n.130 (discussing absence of legislative history for Title VII defining "color" and its
relationship to "race" within meaning of statute); Myers, supra, at 267-70 (noting that federal
legislation prohibiting religious discrimination in employment existed as early as 1883 when Congress
enacted Civil Service Act of 1883): Raechel L. Adams, Comment, English-Only in the Workplace: A
New Judicial Lens Will Provide More Comprehensive Title VII Protection,47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1327,

1330 & n.18 (1998) (noting that very little legislative history exists to determine intended meaning of
national origin because Title VII was primarily aimed at ending race discrimination). The inclusion of
"sex" as a protected class within Title VII has been debated. Many argue that Representative Howard
Smith proposed it in the House in hopes of defeating the entire bill. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1468 & nn.168-69 (2003). But see Debra

Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 334-35 n.268 (2003) (arguing that "sex" was ultimately
included as protected class under Title VII due to lobbying efforts of National Women's Party).
24. See infra notes 68-131 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of discrimination
based upon age and disability and how the Supreme Court has recently limited federal protection from
discrimination based upon these classifications for one group of employees-those employed by state
governments.
25. See infra Part III for a discussion of constitutional challenges to federal employment
discrimination legislation.
26. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the distinction between rights and powers in
constitutional analysis.
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give way under an Eleventh Amendment states' rights analysis, and that the
states should be held to no lesser standard in the employment arena than are
27
private individuals and corporations.
II. A HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AND SLOW GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Throughout this nation's history, opponents of discrimination have
concentrated their efforts in different legal arenas and used different strategies
to effectuate change in the law. 28 Regardless of the approach taken, slowly, over
time, and often after many setbacks, the federal government has become the
primary source individuals turn to for protection from discrimination based upon
race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and ultimately age and disability. 29 The recent
Supreme Court rulings in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents30 and Board of
Trustees v. Garrett31 thus represent the first real curtailment of federal protection
in four decades.
All laws prohibiting employment discrimination in this country have their
genesis in slavery, the consequences of slavery, and its ultimate eradication:
More so than any other group of Americans, African-Americans have
shared a history of struggle for freedom and human dignity, partly
because, right from the start, white Americans sought to deny them
from achieving either. Unlike all other migrants to North America,
Africans did not come of their own free will. They were forcibly
imported in order to meet the demand for cheap labor. As slaves,
African -Americans faced physical cruelty and economic exploitation.
They were inhumanly stripped of the profits of their toil and they were
consciously dehumanized by their masters and the American system of
32
law that defined them as property.
As one author noted, "It took a bloody civil war and a half million dead
before the Thirteenth Amendment could be adopted to at least nominally
abolish slavery." 33 After the Civil War, the legal and social status of blacks

27. Id.
28. Steven S. Lawson, The View From the Nation, in DEBATING THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
1945-1968, at 3 (Steven F. Lawson & Charles Payne eds., 1998). For a "Chronology of Events" crucial
to the civil rights movement in this country, see PETER B. LEVY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, at
xvii-xxiv (1998).
29. For discussion and timeline of relevant Supreme Court decisions, Presidential actions, and
Congressional enactments sometimes contracting and ultimately extending civil rights protection, see
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 142 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997) [hereinafter Loevy].
30. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
31. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
32. LET FREEDOM RING: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MODERN
MOVEMENT 5-6 (Peter B. Levy ed., 1992). The Constitution declared each slave to
fifths of a person for taxation and representation in Congress. HENRY HAMPTON, ET
FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950s
1980s, at xxiii (1990).

CIVIL RIGHTS

count as threeAL., VOICES OF
THROUGH THE

33. Harold Norris, A Perspective on the History of Civil Rights Laws in Michigan, 1996 DET. C.L.
MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 567, 569 (1996). This author's use of the language "nominally abolish slavery" is
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continued to be vastly inferior to whites. 34 Blacks were free from the bonds of
slavery, but remained unequal by legal mandate in the South; they were also
impoverished, and subject to violence-in "the early 1890s a black was lynched
in the South an average of every three days." 35 Because southern whites viewed
blacks as both a political and economic threat, by the beginning of the twentieth
century the South was legally segregated, the federal government consented to
these oppressive laws and blacks were without any meaningful recourse in the
36

political arena.
It was not until 1954, ninety years after the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, that the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.37 And "while Brown stood as a key moment in the history of the civil
a reference to the Supreme Court's eradication of the Civil War Reconstruction era statutes and
restrictive reading of the Constitution in a series of decisions rendered after the Civil War: Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (ruling that railroad carrier could mandate separate sleeping
cars for blacks and whites so long as separate accommodations were equal); the Civil Rights cases, 109
U.S 3, 24-25 (1883) (ruling that 1875 Act of Congress prohibiting discrimination in public
accommodations, such as inns and theaters, was unconstitutional because Fourteenth Amendment
could only be applied to states and not private actors); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 56869 (1875) (ruling that section 6 of Enforcement Act of 1870 could not constitutionally be applied to
states and voiding convictions of whites for murdering blacks); and the later repeal of many of these
Civil War Reconstruction era statutes in 1877, 1894, and 1909. Norris, supra, at 571, 573.
34. The period immediately following the Civil War until as late as 1877, is known as the First
Reconstruction:
It was a plan designed by the federal government to bring the defeated South back into the
Union, and through legislation, manage and regulate race relations in the Old Confederacy.
Instead, Reconstruction became the basis of a social upheaval and a national political
realignment, aspects of which could still be felt in the social and political fiber of the nation
well into the second half of the next century. For the newly freed slaves, supposedly a
primary benefactor of federal legislation in this period, post-Civil War Reconstruction was a
dismal failure.
GARY A. DONALDSON, THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS

MOVEMENT, at v (2000).
35. Loevy, supra note 29, at 8. See also DONALDSON, supra note 34, at v (describing federal
government's reconstruction plan). Statistics from just before the beginning of World War II establish
the median annual family income for a black family to be $489 and the median white family income to
be $1,325, almost three times greater than a black family. See LEVY, supra note 28, at 4 (reprinting
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1950)). Approximately 80% of black households lacked
"some or all plumbing" in comparison to a rate of 47% for white households. Id.
36. Id. "In 1941, less than 5 percent of adult Blacks in the South had managed to register to
vote." Lawson, supra note 28, at 6. In 1944, in Smith v. Allwright, the Supreme Court held that the
Texas Democratic Party's rule excluding blacks from participating in primary elections violated the
Constitution. 321 U.S. 649, 661-66 (1944). Even after this important Supreme Court ruling, by 1952,
only 20% of adult blacks were registered to vote in the South. Lawson, supra note 28, at 6. Literacy
tests continued to be used in the South to exclude blacks from the electoral process. Id.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The law of segregation began to give way prior to the decision in Brown
in a series of Supreme Court decisions focused on segregation in higher education. In 1938, for
example, in Gaines v. Missouri, the Court ruled that Missouri must admit a black applicant to its state
law school where there was no other educational institution in the state offering a legal education for
blacks. 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938). In 1948, in Sipuel v. Regents of the Univ. of Okla., the Court ruled
that a black must be granted admission to the state university because the black institution did not
offer opportunities comparable to those provided at the state university. 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948).
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rights movement, putting the law of the land on the side of those who sought to
eradicate racial inequality, the decision signaled only the beginning of the
modern civil rights movement, not its culmination." 8 It signaled a beginning

because atrocities against blacks continued, most notably in the South. In
Mississippi, for example, from 1882 through 1955, more than 500 blacks had been
lynched, including Emmett Till, a fourteen year-old from Chicago, who in the
summer of 1955 was viciously murdered for "talking fresh" to a white woman in
a store.

39

A. The Beginning-StateLaw

Following on the heels of the Supreme Court decision in Brown, Title VII
marks the true beginning of the modern civil rights era, an era in which federal
legislation was finally enacted to provide meaningful protection against
discrimination and federal legislation continued to expand uninterrupted for
forty years. 40 Title VII is arguably "the most important legislation enacted by
the United States Congress in the twentieth century. '41 Yet, state legislation
prohibiting employment discrimination actually preceded federal law by

In Sweatt v. Painter,the Court ruled that a black law school at Texas State University, which had been
expressly and quickly created for blacks, was not equal to the law school at the University of Texas.
339 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1950). In another decision, McLaurin v. Regents of the Univ. of Okla., the Court
ruled that a black student was not provided an equal law school education when he was admitted to
the University of Oklahoma Law School but was segregated from his white classmates. 339 U.S. 637,

641-42 (1950).
38. LEVY, supra note 28, at 8.
39. Id. at 60. Till had accompanied his cousins and their friends to the local drugstore and, as
they were leaving the store, Till "allegedly whistled and said 'bye baby' to the female shopkeeper." Id.
at 59. That same evening the woman's husband and half-brother abducted Till; they beat Till, shot
him, and threw him into the Tallahatchie River with a cotton gin fan attached to his body. Id. at 60.
For a detailed account of the story, including the national attention it garnered, see HAMPTON, supra
note 32, at 1-15.
40. See Loevy, supra note 29, at 348-50 (describing individual anti-discrimination legislation
enacted after Civil Rights Act of 1964 expanding civil rights protection to age, gender, and disability
related discrimination).
41. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 645 (1995). In the
1960s, Congress enacted numerous anti-discrimination laws:
There were five core policies of nondiscrimination, all of them new in the 1960s. Three were
contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and one in
the Open Housing Act of 1968. First, Title II of the Civil Rights Act banned discrimination
by race in hotels, stores, restaurants, and similar places of public accommodation. Second,
Title IV of the same law aligned the elected branches of the national government behind the
Supreme Court's ruling against school segregation. Third, Titles VI and VII banned job
discrimination by public and private employers (schools and local governments were
exempted in 1964 for political reasons, but were included in 1972). Fourth, the Voting
Rights Act, primarily through its Section 4, banned racial discrimination in registering and
casting ballots. Finally, the Open Housing Act of 1968 added a fifth core requirement,
nondiscrimination in the sale and rental of private housing.
Hugh Davis Graham, Race, History, and Policy: African Americans and Civil Rights Since 1964, in THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 283 (Jack E. Davis ed., 2001).
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approximately two decades, 42 and by the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made
its way through both houses of Congress, twenty-two states had enacted statutes
' 43
These early
commonly referred to as "fair employment practices legislation.
statutes were primarily aimed at race discrimination in employment, but a few
states provided protection against discrimination based upon religion, national
origin, and ancestry. 44 Some state statutes were nothing more than broad
statements of policies against discrimination without either enforcement
procedures or remedies, and other statutes, such as the New York legislation,
created commissions for enforcement, included45 specific definitions of
discrimination, and provided remedies for violations.
Just as the political and social upheavals in the early 1960s provided the
impetus for the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, social activists began their
46
campaign for state anti-discrimination legislation in the North in the 1940s.
These activists hoped that with protective legislation in place, minorities would
be hired in greater numbers in a post-war era of full employment and a strong
growing economy. 47 The goal was to move newly hired minorities into skilled
positions so that they would be less susceptible to unemployment in a future
48
economic downturn.
Although the activists achieved success with their state legislatures, twenty
years after their enactment critics deemed state fair employment practice laws a
failure, and in fact, the economic position of minorities was getting worse, not
better. 49 Critics did call for some amendments to state law, but primarily focused

42. Arthur E. Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation I:
Employers, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 907,907 (1967).
43. See DUANE LOCKARD, TOWARD EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: A STUDY OF STATE AND LOCAL
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 23-24 (1968) (discussing table showing states' passage of antidiscrimination laws between 1945 and 1966).
44. As early as 1930, New Jersey enacted legislation prohibiting age discrimination against
people age forty or older. See KERRY SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS 76 (2001).
Frequently this legislation did not include penalties for violations and included provisions mandating
that "any person 40 or over accepting any employment with the state or any county or city would not
be eligible to join any pension plan." Id. See infra notes 68-101 and accompanying text for discussion
of federal law dealing with age discrimination.
45. See, e.g., Joseph A. Ranney, Looking Further Than Skin: A History of Wisconsin Civil Rights
Law, 68 Wis. L. REV. 20, 21 (July, 1995) (stating that Wisconsin legislature enacted fair employment
practices legislation in 1945, but did not give commission enforcement powers); see also Note, Fair
Employment Practices-A Comparison of State Legislation and Proposed Bills, 24 N.Y.U. L. REV. 398,
399 (1949) (discussing various policy justifications provided for anti-discrimination in employment
bills). In 1945, New York was the first state to enact fair employment practices legislation. HUGH
DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 19601972, at 19 (1990). The model for these state fair employment practices commissions was the
administrative agency model of the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 19-20.
46. Herbert Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical
Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 22,22 (1964).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 23.
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their efforts on reform in the application of existing laws.50 In order to achieve
greater success in eliminating discrimination against minorities, the critics urged
commissions to enforce the existing fair employment practice laws on a larger
scale by targeting the discriminatory practices in specific industries and, in
particular, the exclusionary practices of labor unions.5 1 They also urged
commissions to expedite review and conciliation of individual claims. 52 They
urged public disclosure by state agencies or commissions of the basis for
settlements and easier access for individuals to invoke agency complaint
53
procedures.
As one disillusioned commentator noted in 1964: "with some very few
exceptions, most state FEP commissions have been administered by timid
political appointees, many with little or no professional competence and with an
appalling lack of sensitivity to the realities of... life in the racial ghettos of the
urban north. ' 54 These deficiencies resulted in commissions in virtually every
state dismissing on average 50% of all individual claims of discrimination; the
most active commissions found probable cause of discrimination in only 20% of

the claims. 55 The concern was not with these numbers in isolation, but rather in
combination with a low rate of access and other enforcement problems. 56 In the
57
southern states, individuals were without even this protection.

50. Id.
51. Hill, supra note 46, at 23-25.
52. Id. at 24. See also Carl A. Auerbach, The 1967 Amendments to the Minnesota State Act
Against Discrimination and the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act: A
Comparative Analysis and Evaluation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 231, 232 (1967) (discussing 1967 positive
improvements in Minnesota antidiscrimination laws but recognizing deficiencies, including sometimes
inability to adjudicate discrimination matter in question and inability to obtain judicial review of
negative outcome for complainant in discrimination case, and inadequate relief).
53. Hill, supra note 46, at 25.
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id. at 24. See also GRAHAM, supra note 45, at 22 (noting that during its first twenty years,
New York Human Relations Commission found probable cause in 20% of all discrimination charges).
In New York, although the state fair employment practices legislation had been enacted in 1945, the
first public hearing was held in 1949 and, from 1945 to 1965, the commission conducted only thirtyfour hearings. Id. at 21-22. Although the most recent statistical information reveals that, in 2002, the
EEOC found no reasonable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred in 59.3% of all charges
filed (including Title VII, ADA, ADEA, and Equal Pay Act (EPA) charges), this number is not very
meaningful. All Statutes FY 1992-FY 2002, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2004). Although federal regulations require that when appropriate the EEOC issue a letter indicating
a finding of no "reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred," the
EEOC receives so many charges that it is unable to investigate each of them. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a)
(2001). The EEOC therefore recently eliminated this no cause determination and simply dismisses
many charges without making findings. Michael D. Moberly, The Admissibility of EEOC and Arizona
Civil Rights Division Determinations in State Court Employment DiscriminationLitigation, 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 265, 293 & n.180 (2001).
56. See Hill, supra note 46, at 24-25 (describing state FEP commissions as being "timid" in their
efforts to curb discrimination practices by large businesses and noting difficulty of learning where and
how to file FEP complaint).
57. See GRAHAM, supra note 45, at 34 (noting "in the southern states, aggrieved blacks could
turn only to federal judges, whose local roots combined with weak and cumbersome statutes to offer
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B. The Shift to Federal Law
The ineffectiveness of state employment discrimination laws led to a shift to
federal law to rectify problems of racial discrimination in the workplace. Over
time federal laws were also enacted to address problems of age discrimination
and disability discrimination in the employment arena.
1. Race Discrimination
The failure of these state employment discrimination laws in combination
with the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown, which destabilized entrenched
practices of segregation, caused activists to refocus their attention on the
national government."
The momentum for this movement toward national
reform of race discrimination had been building during the twentieth century as
blacks migrated out of the South in progressively greater numbers.5 9 After
World War II, blacks continued to move out of the South and into the northern
states, where they enjoyed a higher standard of living; by the middle of the
twentieth century, blacks, who could vote in the North, were by sheer numbers
able to exert meaningful influence in the political arena. 60 Other external events
converged to exert pressure on the federal government to change the status of
blacks in this country. 61 During the Cold War, "the newly independent African
states threatened to slip into the Soviet sphere of influence in response to
American racism. Also the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany made
62
Americans acutely aware of the consequences of racism."
Political pressure mounted as the nonviolent protests and marches, which
were typically met with official violence, were broadcast for the first time in
history on national television. 63 One of the most appalling responses was
little hope for substantial change").
58. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, EqualProtection by Law: FederalAntidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrisson and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441,487-88 (2000).
59. At the turn of the twentieth century, 90% of blacks lived in poverty in the South. See
DONALDSON, supra note 34, at 3. During the 1920s, 750,000 blacks left the South for the urban areas
of the North. Id. During the post-war era of the 1940s, one million blacks left the South. Id. at 4.
60. With the increase in gross national product, black income earners also gained economically:
Median black income rose from $1,614 in 1947 to $2,338 in just five years; and as a
percentage of white income, black earnings increased from 41 percent before the war to 57
percent in 1952. When the war ended one million more African Americans had civilian jobs
than before Pearl Harbor, and those working in government service jobs had jumped from
60,000 to 300,000.
Id. at 11.
61. Id. at v.
62. DONALDSON, supra note 34, at v.

63. See Oppenheimer, supra note 41, at 667-68 (describing national political mood swing
following broadcast of 1963 Birmingham, Alabama protest). Nonviolent racial protests garnered
national media attention as early as December 21, 1956, when Martin Luther King, Jr., and a group of
protesters were allowed to sit in any seat on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama. See Loevy, supra note
29, at 24 (stating that national and international news recorded "every word and move" of Martin
Luther King, Jr. on December 21, 1956). The Montgomery Bus Boycott, as it came to be known,
began on December 1, 1955, when Rosa Parks refused to give her seat to a white man, and lasted for
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directed at children and occurred on May 2, 1963, in Birmingham, Alabama: "As
the nation watched on television, black children kneeling in prayer or singing
spirituals as they walked down sidewalks were attacked by vicious police dogs
and rolled down the streets by fire department water cannons." 64
This brutal repression occurred in a place where local ordinance mandated
segregation in both private and public facilities, including restrooms, restaurants,
hospitals, and hotels. 65 The result was often worse than separate, inferior
facilities for blacks, and instead resulted in the complete exclusion of blacks from
downtown restaurants, and denial of access to such fundamental services and
66
resources as ambulances and taxicabs, with criminal penalties for violations.
All of these events provided the backdrop to and the impetus for the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, an Act which has no parallel in United States history, because
"short of a declaration of war, no other act of Congress had a more violent
background-a background of confrontation, official violence, injury and
murder ....

,, 67

2. Age Discrimination
During the debates over Title VII, advocates made attempts to include age
as a protected class, but all such attempts were deflected. 68 When Congress
passed Title VII, however, it contained an express mandate for the Secretary of
Labor to study the problem of age discrimination in employment. 69 The
resulting report provided the impetus for enactment of the ADEA. 70 Title VII
thus bears a direct connection to the ADEA even though these two statutes
contain significant differences in terms of operative provisions.
Discrimination based upon age has not historically received the level of
attention, study, and documentation as have race and sex discrimination in our
society. 71 Certainly older individuals in our society have not been subject to a
history of purposeful subjugation, violence, and abuse comparable to that of
more than one year, as the forty thousand blacks in Montgomery refused to ride public buses until

segregation ended. Id. at 22-24. December 1, 1955, is commonly referred to as the beginning of the
modern civil rights movement in this country. Id. at 22. After Montgomery, civil rights and nonviolent
protests became "big news items." Id. at 24. Not all of the protesters believed in nonviolent, passive
resistance. By late 1961, a growing schism was emerging in the black community "between the forces
of moderation and the forces of a growing radicalism." DONALDSON, supra note 34, at 33.
64. Oppenheimer, supra note 41, at 646.
65. Id. at 658.
66. Id.
67. Loevy, supra note 29, at 40.
68. Nathan E. Holmes, Comment, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: Are
DisparateImpact Claims Available?, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 299,305 (2000).

69. Id. See also U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in
Employment, Report of the Secretary of Labor to the Congress Under Section 715 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (1965).
70. See Holmes, supra note 68, at 305 (describing Department of Labor's report as "the
foundation upon which the ADEA was constructed").
71. JUDITH C. HUSHBECK, OLD AND OBSOLETE: AGE DISCRIMINATION AND THE AMERICAN

WORKER, 1860-1920, at 1 (1989).
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blacks. 72 Nor have the elderly been denied the basic legal rights women were
historically denied. 73 Age is also different as a protected class because it is a
class that is "ever-changing" and, as a result, most people will enjoy its
74
protections.
At the time Congress issued its directive to the Secretary of Labor in 1964,
members of Congress had become genuinely interested in protecting older
workers from job discrimination for a variety of reasons. 75 The Secretary's
report issued in June of 1965 found, not surprisingly, that older workers were
disadvantaged relative to younger workers in their ability to retain employment,
to reenter the labor market after an absence or loss of job, their rates of
unemployment were rising, and they were often subject to arbitrary age
limitations. 76 The ADEA was thus passed in 1967 "in order to eliminate
arbitrary age discrimination in employment, promote the employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age, and to help employers and
workers to meet problems arising from the impact of age on employment."77
One explanation for Congressional focus on age discrimination at this time
in history is straightforward:

72. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination,
such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or
national origin, have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been
subject to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of
their abilities.
Id.
73. Women were denied the right to vote by the United States Supreme Court. See Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (ruling that women did not possess constitutional right
to vote as privilege and immunity of citizenship because they had always been citizens within meaning
of Constitution and had always been denied suffrage). Even after the Nineteenth Amendment was
ratified, in 1920. courts sometimes refused to allow women to sit on juries by refusing to extend the
definition of "person" by implication of the Nineteenth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Welosky, 177
N.E. 656, 661 (Mass. 1931). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (stating that "the right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of sex"). In Welosky, the court found the situation of women different from "previous ones where the
right to vote had been extended to members of an existing classification theretofore disqualified, as
women were a whole new class." Nickolai G. Levin, Constitutional Statutory Synthesis, 54 ALA. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 n.16 (2003). Before the twentieth century, women lost almost all rights to hold
property upon marriage, they were not permitted to enter contracts without their husbands' consent,
and they were not permitted to enter certain occupations, such as the practice of law. See Julie M.
Spanbauer. Scarlett O'Haraas Feminist: The Contradictory,Normalizing Forceof Law and Culture, 5:2
LAW/TEXT/CULTURE 45,56-57 (2001) (explaining legal and cultural constraints placed on 19th century
women).
74. Marlinee C. Clark, Note, Discrimination Claims and "Same-Actor" Facts: Inference or
Evidence?, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 183, 203 (1997).
75. See U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Report to Congress on Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Studies 50 (1981) [hereinafter Interim Report] (stating that Congress was interested
in eliminating arbitrary age discrimination in employment and promoting employment of older
persons based on ability).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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The proportion of people over age 65 in America remained quite small
until the twentieth century; in 1900 only 4% of the population was 65
or older. These people continued to participate in the work life of the
community. In 1890, 68.2% of men 65 and older were active members
of the work force. Three decades78 later, a majority of all men 65 and
over remained in the work force.
By 1976, twenty million people were age sixty-five and older, due in large
part to advances in medicine and nutrition. 79 And yet only 25% of men aged
sixty-five and older were working and a mere three and two-fifths percent of all
people aged sixty-five and older were active in the labor market.80
Declining fertility and longer, healthier lifespans, both by-products of
economic development in this country during the twentieth century, combined to
shift the population demographics.81 These changes, however, do not account
for discriminatory attitudes and the lower rates of participation by older workers
in the workforce. Researchers have documented discrimination against older
employees occurring as early as the end of the nineteenth century when
employers would invoke age limitations at the hiring stage and would screen out
82
many applicants through the use of "restrictive physical examinations."
Indeed, "[t]here is some evidence to indicate that even at this time, negative
attitudes about the capacities and productivity of the aged were already common
in the nation and that these ideas continued to gain in strength ... -83 It appears
4
that "age discrimination was widely entrenched and pervasive by 1900."8
These discriminatory attitudes toward older workers could not be
transformed into acts of employment discrimination until these workers were
somehow divested of their control over major industries. 5 Another change
during the twentieth century allowed just such a transformation to take place:
the economy's shift from a more rural, agrarian system to one of rapid
technological advancement and industrialization. 86 Older workers were made

78. Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Services for the Elderly Poor, et al., at 20, Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (No. 74-1044).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 20-21.
81. See HUSHBECK, supra note 71, at 10 (noting that falling birth rates and increasing longevity
have caused increase in elderly population).
82. Interim Report, supra note 75, at 55. Linguistic evidence of abuse and discriminatory
attitudes toward older people has been found to exist in the 1820s:
A large vocabulary of abuse had been invented for them as early as the 1820s when they
remained firmly in control of economic relations and political power. Ironically, by the turn
of the century, when old people were disproportionately in economic distress, the
disparaging epithets seem largely to have disappeared.
HUSHBECK, supra note 71, at 24 n.33.
83. Interim Report, supra note 75, at 55.
84. SEGRAVE, supra note 44, at 8. The author notes, however, that "there is little agreement on
the question of when age discrimination began and when it flourished" in this country. Id. at 5.
85. HUSHBECK, supra note 71, at 6.
86. Id. at 45-54. From 1810 though 1850, the percentage of workers engaged in farming fell from
80% to 55%. Id. at 45-46. "By 1890, 9.5 million persons (43 percent of the labor force) worked in
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less powerful as their "unique skills, special know-how, and long experience"
became irrelevant due to technological advances, which changed the industrial
structure to consolidate resources and capital in fewer hands. 87 As specialization
increased, the skills of the individual worker became less important, and laborsaving technology together with greater use of immigrant workers pushed older
American workers out of the job market.88 Although a growing bias toward
younger workers may well have resulted from the ever-increasing pace of work
life in this period of specialization and industrialization, the development of
other governmental programs and laws also meant that older workers simply
89
cost the employer more money.
In the mid-1930s, the Social Security system was introduced in this country
to provide the financial resources to encourage workers to retire. 90 The Social
Security system was also instrumental in creating and fostering an expectation of
retirement as not only an appropriate but also a routine and expected occurrence
in employment. 91 This "development of retirement as a social pattern in industry
may have served to enhance and legitimize employment discrimination
practices." 92 On the heels of the Social Security laws, during the 1940s, this
nation saw a substantial increase in formal private pension offerings by
employers, which were initially instituted as an incentive to encourage executive
retirement at an earlier age. 93 Pension coverage was also expanded during this
time to cover a greater segment of the workforce, in part due to unions and
collective bargaining agreements and also due to the development of Internal
94
Revenue regulations promoting employer pension plans.

agriculture." Id. at 46. During this same timeframe, farming became more mechanized and farming
methods were improved, leading to greatly increased production. Id. at 51. These advances meant
that significantly fewer people were necessary to produce an even greater output. HUSHBECK, supra
note 71, at 51.
87. Id. at4,6.
88. Id. at 7.
89. Id.
90. See EDWIN E. WITE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 3-110 (1962)
(chronicling history of Social Security Act). "The Social Security Act of 1935 established a threemember agency known as the Social Security Board to administer the old age and survivors insurance,
unemployment compensation, and public assistance programs." Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles,
Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1111, 1212 (2000). See also Interim Report, supra note 75, at 14 (noting that policies encouraging
workers to retire arose in wake of development of social security).
91. Interim Report, supra 75, at 14 (describing Social Security as creating expectation of
retirement for older workers).
92. Id. at 56.
93. Id. at 14.
94. Id. Until the middle of the 1930s, a pension plan was treated by many states as a "'gratuity'no promise was involved. It was merely a 'thank-you' from the employer, upon retirement, if the
employer wanted to give it then." Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation:An Overview of Major Claims
and Defenses, SH082 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 96 (2003). Before World War II, pensions were unregulated
and thus frequently unenforceable. Id. Continuing after World War II and until 1974, pension rights
began to improve, but were subject to state and not federal law. Id. After 1974, federal law
preempted state law, setting national standards. Id.
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The standard reasons employers provided during the 1930s and 1940s for
refusing to hire older workers were ostensibly rational and cost-based. 95 Two
reasons frequently advanced-the higher costs of group insurance for older
workers and workers' compensation costs associated with an older workforceresulted in employers adopting mandatory retirement policies on a large-scale
during the 1940s and 1950s and setting their age limits for initial hiring as low as
age thirty-five. 96 Finally, employers justified their age discrimination by the
lower salary expectations of younger, entry-level employees in comparison to
older, more experienced workers. 97 In the late 1950s and continuing into the
1960s, the period immediately preceding enactment of the ADEA, the majority
of reasons given by employers for reticence to hire older workers were not
appreciably different, were based upon negative stereotypes about older
workers, and were unsubstantiated. 98
The treatment of disabled individuals throughout history in this country has

been different from age discrimination in that society has by and large excluded
or separated disabled individuals. 99 And while the disability rights movement in
this country shares some common features with the civil rights movement of the
1950s and 1960s, the disabled community is unique as a protected class for the

simple reason that "[ilmpairments are variable, and they are not dichotomous
conditions." 1 00 Physical and mental impairments can be of varying degree in

95. SEGRAVE, supra note 44, at 63.

96. Interim Report, supra note 75, at 56. Many employers believed that older workers were
"more accident-prone" and that "their reflexes" had "slowed down." SEGRAVE, supra note 44, at 130.
Yet studies revealed that by employing older workers an employer did not experience increased
workers' compensation costs. Id. at 63. As to private pension plans, some studies concluded that age
limitations were necessary because without them an employer's "very existence" was "threatened."
Id. at 64. Common age limitations for hiring were age forty to forty-five. Id. at 69.
97. See Gary Minda, Aging Workers in the Postindustrial Era, 26 STETSON L. REv. 561, 581
(1996) (noting that currently under ADEA, "[an employer's decision to cut costs by focusing on
salary level or years of service of employees may not be circumstantial evidence of age
discrimination").
98. The reasons given by employers included the following survey answers, which were refuted
by New York State Labor Department data:
(1) older workers were less productive (surveys were cited to show such allegations were
untrue); (2) they were frequently absent (a 1956 survey by the United States Labor
Department showed older workers had a 20 percent better attendance record than younger
ones); (3) they were involved in more accidents (the same survey found that workers 45 and
over had 2.5 percent fewer disabling injuries and 25 percent fewer nondisabling injuries than
those under 45); (4) they did not stay on the payroll long enough to justify the hiring expense
(separation rates for older employees were much lower than for the younger ones); (5) it was
too costly to provide them with adequate pensions (it often depended on the type of plan);
(6) they caused major increases in employee group insurance plans (it depended on the
nature of the plan); (7) they did not have the needed job skills (evidence was to the
contrary); (8) they were inflexible and unimaginative and had trouble getting along with
younger workers (a sweeping generalization with no supporting evidence).
SEGRAVE, supra note 44, at 114-15.
99. JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABILITY POLICY AND
THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 31-32 (2003).
100. SHARON BARNA'r & RICHARD SCOTCH, DISABILITY PROTESTS: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS,
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terms of "visibility; stability; the degree of interference with physical, mental, or
cognitive functioning; the degree to which the disabilities threaten life; the
degree of pain involved; and the degree to which the disabilities pose ongoing
1
medical problems."''
3. Disability Discrimination
Disability discrimination can be separated into roughly four periods in U.S.
history; this breakdown, of course, somewhat oversimplifies the history, but is
useful as a general guide to the status of disabled individuals over time. 10 2 First,
from 1700 until approximately 1920, "extended families provided care for
disabled persons; when societal indifference produced abuse, state-funded
institutions were created to house indigent disabled citizens." t0 3 The second
period extended from approximately 1920 until 1960 and "was characterized by
segregation, the growth of rehabilitative medicine, and the establishment of
1970-1999, at xv (2001). In part, because civil rights groups recognized that disability and remedies for
combating discrimination based upon disability were different than race, gender and other forms of
discrimination, disability was not included in the early civil rights legislation:

The first attempt to create a disability rights law was undertaken by Senator Hubert
Humphrey and Representative Charles Vanik; their approach was a simple one, namely to
add handicapped persons to the classes of persons protected by the Civil Rights Acts of 1964
and 1968. This move, had it been successful, would have forged a close relationship between
civil rights and disability rights groups. Instead, disability rights laws emerged separately
from other civil rights laws, partially because of a lack of enthusiasm by traditional civil
rights groups to accept disabled citizens into the civil rights movement.
STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 248 (1989).
101. BARNA-r & SCOTCH, supra note 100, at xv-xvi. And indeed great differences exist between
physical and mental disabilities in terms of treatment, employment considerations, and prejudice. See
Rachel Rubey, Note, There's No Place Like Home: Housing for the Most Vulnerable Individuals With
Severe Mental Disabilities,63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1731 (2002) (asserting that individuals with mental
disabilities are more susceptible to discrimination than physically disabled individuals). The inclusion
of mentally disabled individuals in disability laws has been historically resisted. Id. & n.10. In fact,
Senator Armstrong argued against inclusion of mental disabilities within the coverage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Leonard S. Rubenstein, Mental Disorder and the ADA, in
GOSTIN & BEYER infra note 115, at 209. "[P]rejudice against people with mental disorders runs very
deep" in our society. Id.
102. See infra note 103-106 and accompanying text for discussion of four historical periods of
disability discrimination.
103. Id. During this time, disabled individuals were subject to horrific treatment. Stephanie A.
Fishman, Note, Individuals with Disabilities but Without Mitigating Measures. 46 WAYNE L. REV. 2013,
2016 (2000).
In 1883, a movement was started with the intention of improving society by eliminating the
reproductive capability of mentally deficient children and institutionalizing society's
"feebleminded." The "Eugenics" movement [as it came to be known] died out in the United
States during the 1930's, when it was scientifically proven that people without disabilities
were having just as many children with disabilities, if not more, than parents who were
disabled.
Id. "Eugenics" means "well born" and was developed by those who believed that the majority of
social problems were caused by the disabled. Id. & n.14. State laws requiring sterilization of
individuals suffering from hereditary mental illness were found constitutional in the early twentieth
century. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927).
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special organizations that attempted to educate the public on the needs of
disabled persons."' 1 4 During the third period, from 1960 to 1975, the disability
rights movement took shape and Congress enacted legislation.10 5 During present
times, the fourth period, organizations designed to advance the interests of
10 6
disabled individuals have expanded.
The exclusion of disabled individuals from society generally and from
employment opportunities more specifically has occurred:
in part from limitations in mobility, dexterity, and communication
imposed by disabling conditions. But even greater barriers to the
opportunities of modern society have been imposed by nonhandicapped persons, who have feared disabled people and have been
preoccupied with that group's inabilitiesand problems rather than their
17
capabilities.
Society has historically stigmatized disabled individuals-such individuals
have been feared, pitied, viewed as helpless, not worthy of trust, and invariably
viewed with discomfort by other members of society. 10 8 In particular, the failure
to understand the needs and capabilities of mentally and physically disabled
individuals throughout history has consistently been translated into "unrealistic,
negative, and paternalistic" attitudes toward the disabled community. 109
"Compared to other public policies for disabled persons, those dealing with
employment have the longest history." 110 In response to the large number of
disabled veterans returning home after World War I, the federal government
began enacting legislation addressing employment discrimination based upon
disability."1 After World War II and the Korean War, during the 1950s and
1960s, the federal government and health care professionals once again faced the
problem of disability discrimination in employment. 112 The disability rights
movement had also become more organized and more cohesive and sought

104. SWITZER, supra note 99, at 31.
105. Id.
106. Id. This fourth period has also been politically conservative and has produced "what is
regarded as a generally restrictive interpretation of disability rights law." Id.
107. PERCY, supranote 100, at 1.
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 193.
111. Id.
112. Laura C. Scotellaro, Note, The Mandated Move From Institutions to Community Care.
Olmstead v. L.C., 31 Loy. U. CHI.L.J. 737, 741 (2000). See also BARNATr & SCOTCH, supranote 100,
at 14 (discussing increased prevalence of impairments because of war and medical advancement
lengthening life span of disabled). Polio epidemics in this country in 1946, 1952, and 1953 also resulted
in many physical impairments. Id. In 1974, after the Vietnam War, Congress enacted the Vietnam
Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act. See PERCY, supra note 100, at 196 (discussing
employment protection for disabled population and describing VEVRAA's educational assistance
objective). The legislation was more expansive than previous legislation aimed at returning veterans.
Id. Its provisions include increased educational benefits; it requires affirmative action in hiring for
certain federal contracts, subcontracts, and federal agencies. Id. This law was enacted over President
Ford's veto. Id.
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expansion of social security and rehabilitation for the disabled community. 1 3 In
1954, Congress responded with the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments to
the Vocational Act of 1918.114 In 1968, Congress passed the Architectural
Barriers Act (ABA), requiring all buildings constructed5 or altered by the federal
government be accessible by persons with disabilities."
These laws, rather than excluding, emphasized integration and bringing
disabled individuals into the community." 6 The problem with the early
legislation, however, is that it was evaluated and justified "largely from the
vantage [point] of society, not the disabled person.'" 7 The reasons given to
justify the Vocational Rehabilitation Act and the programs created pursuant to it
were cost-based: that the cost of rehabilitation was less, that the tax revenue
generated by disabled individuals who were able to work was more, and more
working disabled meant that fewer disabled individuals would be participating in
social welfare programs.118
By the 1970s, lawmakers realized that vocational rehabilitation alone would
not resolve the problem of underemployment and exclusion of disabled
individuals from the workforce. 1' 9 Other barriers to employment existed and
needed to be addressed. 120 Society began to view the employment of disabled
individuals as more than a desirable goal for government and society, but as a
right possessed by the disabled individual.' 2' Congress soon enacted the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to prohibit discrimination in any federal program
against otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities and to require affirmative
action. 122 As a result, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 became "the most
113. See Scotellaro, supra note 112, at 741 (stating how advocates attempted to meet needs of
growing disabled population through rehabilitation and social services).
114. Id. The 1918 Act, the earliest broad federal program to aid disabled individuals, "provided
federal funds, at a fifty-percent matching rate, to state rehabilitation agencies for counseling,
vocational training, and job placement services for physically handicapped persons." PERCY, supra
note 100, at 44.
115. See LAWRENCE 0. GosTN & HENRY A. BEYER, IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 11 (1993) (explaining
Architectural Barriers Act as "legislative building block" to ADA).
116. See Scotellaro, supra note 112, at 741 (discussing how maintaining and rehabilitation
practices adopted through legislation sought to incorporate disabled populations into community).
117. PERCY, supra note 100, at 193.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. GOSTIN & BEYER, supra note 115, at 11. The Rehabilitation Act also applied to executive
agencies and the United States Postal Service. Id. The Act's affirmative action requirements
extended only to federal government hiring decisions and to entities that are contractors With the
federal government. Id. Other federal legislation enacted at this time for the benefit of disabled
individuals includes: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1400
(2001); The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee
(2001); The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2001); The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2001); The Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (2001); and The Air Carriers Access Act of
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significant building block for the ADA," which incorporates many core
requirements, such as the reasonable accommodation requirement.' 23
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 after three years of congressional
debate and study; the ADA is also accompanied by an extensive legislative
history documenting the continued exclusion, underemployment, and poverty
disabled individuals experience in our society. 124 It represents the most
expansive and far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the United States
Congress to eradicate discrimination.125 More than eighty years have elapsed
since the first federal disability legislation, and yet the misconceptions and
126
discriminatory attitudes against disabled individuals persist.
Employers, and for that matter, co-workers, continue to underestimate the
productive capacity of disabled individuals and also to prefer a certain social
distance from them:
The reluctance of employers to hire persons with disabilities is rooted
in common myths and misunderstandings, which include the ideas that
the employment of disabled persons will increase insurance and
worker[s'] compensation costs, cause higher absenteeism among
employees, reduce productivity, harm the morale and productivity of
nonhandicapped workers, and require costly accommodation
measures.

127

The ADA is the youngest of the federal employment discrimination
legislation, enjoying full operative effect for just over a decade. 128 And
unfortunately, the physically and mentally disabled have made slow progress,
with only small gains in rates of employment. 129 For example, from 1986 to 2001,
the rate of employment of disabled individuals had increased by ten percent, but
this increase results in the employment of just over half of all disabled workers
1986, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (2001). Id. at 12-13. For a listing and description of federal legislation, see
DUANE F. STROMAN, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION TO

SELF-DETERMINATION 77-81 (2003).
123. GOSTIN & BEYER, supranote 115, at 11.
124. See Tim Edwards, Constitutional Limits on an Employee's Right to Dictate the Terms of an
Addict's Recovery Under the ADA: Some Sobering Concerns, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1679, 1696 & n.81

(1999) (noting Congressional opinion of Americans with Disabilities); Scotellaro, supra note 112, at
745, 764 (discussing congressional findings describing unequal treatment of disabled population).
125. Scotellaro, supranote 112, at 745. See also Heather R. McDonald, Garrett Under Title II of
the Americans With DisabilitiesAct: Its Broad Implications to Civil Rights Laws, 52 DEPAUL L. REV.

993, 993-97 (2003) (discussing legislative sweep of ADA). The ADA consists of five different titles,
with Title I addressing employment discrimination. Id. at 997. Title II addresses discrimination in
"public services, public employment, public communications, and public transportation." Id. & n.28.
Title III prohibits discrimination in public accommodations, Title IV prohibits discrimination with
telecommunications, and Title V includes miscellaneous provisions. Id.
126. See PERCY, supranote 100, at 194 (detailing misconceptions of disabled in employment).
127. Id.
128. The ADA became effective as to employers with fifteen or more employees as of July 26,
1992. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 108, 104 SAT. 327, 337 (1990)
(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2001)).
129. See PERCY, supra note 100, at 194 (describing employment opportunities as growing at
"snail's pace").
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who are willing to work. 130

This low rate of employment and the resulting

poverty exist despite the fact that government-sponsored surveys report high
levels of employer satisfaction with disabled workers. 131 Although progress has
been slow, the ADA has been instrumental in assisting disabled members of
society achieve access to employment.
C. The Development and Prominence of FederalLaw
When Congress originally enacted Title VII in 1964, it was as revolutionary
in transforming rights and duties in the employment setting as was the ADA in
1990.132 As a result, many initially viewed Title VII with fear, hostility, and
skepticism. 133 Over time, expectations of protection from discrimination in the
workplace grew, and Title VII, along with the other antidiscrimination laws that
followed, simply became a part of the legal and social landscape in this
country. 134 As the federal employment discrimination laws became a part of the
settled expectations of workers and employers in this country, Congress
extended the scope of these laws.

130. STROMAN, supra note 122, at 99. The number increased from 46% to 56%. Id.
131. Id. at 97-99. The Harris poll conducted by the National Organization on Disability in 2000,
concluded that 81% of nondisabled people aged eighteen to sixty-four are working full or part time
compared with 56% of disabled people aged eighteen to sixty-four working full or part time (this
number is based upon people who said they were able to work). Id at 98-99. The percentage of
nondisabled people aged eighteen to sixty-four who live in poverty is 10% in comparison to 19% of
disabled individuals aged eighteen to sixty-four living in poverty. Id. A 1987 study sponsored by the
International Center for the Disabled, the National Council on the Handicapped, and the President's
Committee on Employment of the Handicapped also reported "that the costs of making
accommodations were generally not very expensive and should not be considered a significant barrier
to employing disabled workers." PERCY, supra note 100, at 216, 219.
132. See McDonald, supra note 125, at 996 (describing consensus that ADA was modern
generation's Civil Rights statute). See also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 413, 413-14 (1991) (quoting American politicians' descriptions of ADA as significant Civil Rights
legislation for disabled population); Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Against Public
Entities After Garrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41, 55 (2001) (comparing purposes of ADA and Civil Rights
legislation).
133. Those who opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "described it as a 'blackjack,' and a
'political foray' directed solely at the South. Opponents in both houses felt the bill was 'so drafted as
to concentrate the major impact of its atrocious provisions on the southern states .... ' Mary Ellen
Maatman. Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court's Rhetoric and it Constitutive
Effects on Employment DiscriminationLaw, 60 U. PI'r. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
134. Jack M. Balkin, History Lesson, LEGAL AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2002, at 48. In fact, forty years ago,
the Supreme Court was willing to defer to Congress in this matter:
Equally important, by letting Congress take the lead in identifying which civil rights
protections were necessary, the Warren Court could learn from social movements and take
into account evolving popular understandings of equality. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
addressed women's rights, for example, well before the court did in the 1970s. The
Rehnquist Court also rejects this approach, saying in effect that it's irrelevant that a popular
consensus has grown in favor of civil rights for the elderly or the disabled, or that a
democratically elected body like Congress has responded to a changing social climate.
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As originally enacted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibited
employment discrimination by private employers and labor unions based upon
race, color, national origin, religion, and sex. 135 Title VII also established the
EEOC and vested the five members of the EEOC with the authority to
investigate charges of discrimination and to establish procedures for mediation
of these charges.1 36 Although Congress did not originally give the EEOC
enforcement power, the Attorney General was statutorily empowered to
intervene when charges of discrimination were filed and to file lawsuits when it
believed a pattern or practice of discrimination existed. 137 Congress amended
Title VII to apply to governmental employers in 1972.138 Congress similarly
extended the ADEA two years later. 139 When Congress enacted the ADA in
1990, it applied to state governmental employers and expressly incorporated the
140
remedies provided under Title VII.
Other important amendments and enactments over the years clarified or
added substantive protections. For example, Title VII was amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978 to explicitly recognize that
discrimination based upon pregnancy is discrimination "because of sex" within
the meaning of Title VII.141 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1994 was
enacted to combat discriminatory leave policies for dependent care and care of
other family members. 142 Another important amendment to Title VII was the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.1 43 As originally enacted in 1964, Title VII provided
successful litigants with only equitable relief (and thus no right to a jury trial) in
the form of hiring or reinstatement, back pay, and other appropriate equitable

135. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE 241 (1985).
To
supporters of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, "the most important abridgements of civil rights involved
private acts of discrimination-by employers who refused to hire blacks or restaurant owners who
refused to serve them at lunch counters." Balkin, supra note 134, at 46.
136. See WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 135, at 241 (outlining major provisions of Title VII).
137. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b)-(e) (2001) (describing attorney general's authority and
role in bringing civil rights actions).
138. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 135, at 241. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b), (h), (i)
(2001) (including government in definition of person, employer, industry, and state); Ann Carey

Juliano, The More You Spend, The More You Save: Can the Spending Clause Save Federal AntiDiscrimination Laws?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1111, 1132 n.175 (2001) (noting Title VII's amendment

changing definition of employer to include governments).
139. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (2001) (including government as employer covered under act);
Landau, supra note 11, at 176 (discussing certain exemptions applying to government employees
despite AEDA's extended coverage).
140. Landau, supra note 11, at 176-77. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5), 12117(a) (2001) (excluding
only federal or U.S. government from definition of employer and expressly incorporating Title VII
remedies).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2001). See also International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1991) (holding PDA prohibited employment criteria blanketly precluding
women from work that could potentially harm fetus, regardless of fertility).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2001).
143. For a discussion of all of the changes created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Glen D.
Nager & Julia M. Broas, Enforcement Issues: A PracticalOverview, in The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A
Symposium, 54 LA. L. REV. 1473, 1474-81 (1994).
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relief, including front pay. 14 4 The 1991 amendments were significant because
they expressly allowed: jury trials in cases of intentional discrimination, an award
of compensatory damages, and in appropriate cases, punitive damages. 145 These
damages are dependent upon the size of the employer and range from $50,000 to
$300,000 for the total damage award, including both compensatory and punitive
Punitive damages are not available, however, against a
damages. 146
t47
employer.
governmental
Since the ADA incorporates Title VII remedies, this relief is similarly
available for disability claimants. 48 The ADEA was not amended by this
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Instead, from its original enactment, it
incorporated selected Fair Labor Standards Act provisions allowing for relief in
the form of unpaid wages, and in the case of a willful violation of the Act,
liquidated damages in an additional amount equal to double the unpaid wages
award. 149 The various amendments to these civil rights statutes over time
demonstrate just how far federal employment discrimination law has come in
occupying the field of employment discrimination law and in protecting workers
in this country.
The level of general acceptance federal employment discrimination laws
enjoy today did not exist, however, in 1964. Opponents to Title VII were
150
numerous and vocal in their arguments against its constitutional validity.
Their legal arguments, which were unsuccessful, were based on the First
Amendment right of association. 151 Simply stated, the opponents to Title VII
firmly believed that private employers had a constitutional right not to associate
in the workplace with members of other races and other protected classes and
thus were not required to hire these individuals. 152 The workplace was seen as
analogous to a private club, a club in which individual job applicants had no
rights to nondiscriminatory treatment during the hiring process and a

144. Michael D. Moberly, Evolution in the Civil Rights Revolution: The Survival of Employment
DiscriminationClaims for Pain and Suffering, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1999). See also 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2001) (providing availability of injunctive or equitable relief). Courts
routinely award front pay to compensate for the time from the date of judgment to the point of
reinstatement or hiring. King v. Staley, 849 F.2d 1143, 1144 (8th Cir. 1988). If the court finds that
reinstatement is not feasible because, for instance, the working relationship between the parties has
deteriorated to such an extent that they are unable to work together, the court will generally order a
lump sum payment as front pay. See Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Ed., 917 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (6th Cir.
1990) (describing awarding this remedy).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(c) (2001).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).
148. See Moberly, supranote 144, at 6 & n.28 (noting that ADA contains no remedial provisions,
but rather inculpates Title VII remedies).
149. Id. at 9-10. See also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2001) (detailing specific enforcement procedures for
ADeA).
150. Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 489-93.
151. Id. at 489.
152. Id. at 489-91.
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discrimination-free work environment. 153
Pointing to the demonstrations and violent clashes between law
enforcement and protesters over civil rights, southern governors and senators
argued that if the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became law, it would encourage
"government by intimidation," "mob violence," and even "anarchy. '154 Senator
Strom Thurmond referred to the Civil Rights Act as "socialism" because he
believed it would result in "government control of the means of production. '155
He incited fear by asking, "Whose jobs are these Negroes and minorities going
to take, other Negroes or white peoples' jobs? 1 156 The clear implication was that
whites would lose jobs, and he even predicted that the new law would destroy
seniority rights in unions. 157 At this time, legal rights vested in the employer,
not the employee.
The settled expectations of employers were heavily
influenced by the employment-at-will doctrine, a concept that permeates
employment law in this country. 158 Title VII thus represented a major incursion
159
into that doctrine.
Advocates rarely make these kinds of arguments today, and when they are
made, they are not taken very seriously because the employment setting is not
viewed as simply a private club or private association. 16° It has become accepted
in this country that individuals, whether employees or applicants for
employment, have rights; they are entitled to equal treatment, and under some
of these federal laws, equal opportunity to participate in the workforce and to
compete for jobs. 161 In fact, from the beginning, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is

153. See id. at 489-93 (discussing distinctions made between civil and social rights).
154. BIRTH STRUGGLE OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (Films for the Humanities and Sciences
2002). The videotape documents important speeches and debates regarding the Civil Rights Act of
1964. One of those debates is a debate broadcast live on CBS between Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
of Minnesota, the sponsor of the bill, and Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. The employment-at-will doctrine allows an employer or employee to end the employment
relationship at any time (if there is no term of duration) for any reason. Gary Minda, Aging Workers
in the Postindustrial Era, 26 STETSON L. REV. 561, 561-62 (1996).
"Federal and state antidiscrimination legislation which forbids the employer to terminate the relationship also governs the atwill relationship, especially legislation with any intent to discriminate on the grounds of race, gender,
ethnicity, age, disability, or pension status of the employee." Id.
159. Id.
160. Although these arguments were freely and fiercely advanced by public figures, they have
recently been described as sounding like "voices from another world." Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at
493. For a contemporary argument against the need for anti-discrimination law in this country, see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION LAws 59-78
(1992) (making economic arguments against such legislation).
161. The disparate treatment prohibitions in Title VII represent typical equal treatment
requirements. John V. Jacobi, Federal Power, Segregation, and Mental Disability, 39 HoUS. L. REV.
1231, 1237 (2003). The reasonable accommodation requirements under the ADA also represent equal
opportunity legislation. Id. In fact, very early in the history of Title VII. the Supreme Court found
that Title VII went beyond mandating equal treatment: "The objective of Congress in the enactment
of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment
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credited with creating an expectation of uniform, federal protection for
employees. 162 For example, only after 1964 was nearly a century of doubt
resolved when in 1975, the Supreme Court ruled that the Civil War
Reconstruction Era statutes applied in private employment settings and to
private actors. 163 These statutes proved important vehicles for litigants because
they allowed for damages at a time when Title VII was limited to equitable
relief. 164 The enactment of Title VII and the expectations that grew out of it thus
165
breathed new life into these statutes.
From the beginning, the federal employment discrimination laws were
designed by Congress to coexist with the already existing state laws and to
encourage state resolution of employment discrimination claims. 166 Various
administrative devices and procedures were established so as not to displace
state law in this area. 167 And from almost the beginning, federal laws became the
primary avenue by which individuals sought protection from discrimination in
of
the workplace. 168 For example, in 1992, individuals filed 72,302 charges 169
charges.
such
84,442
filed
individuals
2002,
in
EEOC;
the
with
discrimination
The reasons for having co-existing laws are in large part reflected in the
legislative differences-many state laws do not provide a similar level of
substantive protection from discrimination, the remedies available to successful
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)
(ruling in favor of disparate impact as theory of liability under Title VII).
162. See Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 502 (stating, "The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provoked
sustained public deliberation about the role of the federal government that fundamentally transformed
American traditions of federalism. Americans now believe that a core function of the federal
government is to prohibit discrimination in the public and private sectors.").
163. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454. 459-60 (1975) (ruling that 42 U.S.C. §
1981, which, among other things, prohibits discrimination in contracts, was applicable to private
actors). For a discussion of the Supreme Court rulings regarding private actors and the applicability of
other Reconstruction Era statutes, see Jack M. Beerman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981,992-1002 (2002).
164. See supra note 145 and accompanying text for discussion of 1991 Amendments to Title VII.
165. See Beerman, supra note 163, at 1021 (noting that there was ubiquitous civil rights
legislation after three-quarters of century of no significant civil rights legislation between 1875 and
1957).
166. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(1) (2001) (stipulating that EEOC shall cooperate with state
and local agencies). See also Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) (holding
that federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act did not preempt more generous state laws requiring
reinstatement after pregnancy leave and finding specifically that PDA is "a 'floor beneath which
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise') (quoting
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390,396 (9th Cir. 1985)).
167. Id. The EEOC is required to defer to state agencies to allow state processing of
employment discrimination charges before federal processing. Moberly, supra note 55, at 266-67 &
n.12. The EEOC also has "worksharing" agreements with state agencies. Id. at 269.
168. See Beerman, supra note 163, at 988 (noting flood of civil rights litigation and legislation
since 1950s has repeatedly justified imposing limitations on reach of civil rights statutes by referring to
explosion of civil rights litigation).
169. See EEOC Charge Statistics, supra note 22 (listing total number of individual charges for
discrimination).
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litigants are frequently more limited, and some states do not provide for an
170
award of attorneys fees to a successfl, litigant.
The face of an employment discrimination charge has also changed over
time. Initially, employment discrimination claims filed with both the state
171
commissions and with the EEOC were primarily based upon a failure to hire.
Over time, the definition of discrimination and the corresponding expectations
of employees have expanded to encompass claims based upon discriminatory
termination, failure to promote and various aspects of the employment
172
environment, such as harassment.
III. FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES

Opponents to federal employment discrimination laws challenged their
constitutionality. Several lines of Supreme Court cases have addressed these
challenges. Part IIL.A discusses cases analyzing congressional power to legislate
under the Commerce Clause. 73
Part III.B discusses cases analyzing
congressional power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity to private damage claims in federal court. 174 Part III.C
discusses cases analyzing congressional power to abrogate state immunity under
175
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Power to Legislate Under the Commerce Clause
Unlike the recent decisions in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents 176 and

170. See Jaclyn A. Okin, Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?:An Analysis of University of

Alabama v. Garrett and its Impact on People with Disabilities,9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
663, 688-89 (2001) (discussing state laws protecting people with disabilities); Landau, supra note 11, at
189-94 (discussing state employment discrimination laws). See also McCafferty, supra note 11, at 107273 (discussing primarily Alabama's employment discrimination statutes). For a table including all fifty
states and their employment discrimination laws, see Shelton supra note 18, at 858.
171. See Balkin, supra note 134, at 46 (discussing evolving nature of employment discrimination
law).
172. Victor Andres Rodriquez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Bourne: The
Beginning of the End of Preclearance?,91 CAL. L. REV. 769, 817 (2003) ("The parameters of the

[Voting Rights] Act, like those of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have been determined through a
dialogue between Congress and the Court, which continually reified and expanded the statute's
provisions."). See also Nicole J. DeSario, Reconceptualizing Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate
Impact Discrimination Law, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 479, 480 (2003) (discussing expansion by

both Congress and judiciary of protection under Title VII pursuant to disparate impact theory of
liability).
173. See infra notes 176-95 and accompanying text for discussion of federal power to legislate
under Commerce Clause.
174. See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text for discussion of Congressional power to
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
175. See infra notes 201-25 and accompanying text for discussion of Congressional power to
legislate under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment.
176. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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177
Board of Trustees v. Garrett,
the question of the constitutional validity of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 immediately made its way to the United States Supreme
Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States178 in 1964 and the judgment
was unanimous. 179 In this case, a motel operator for whom 75% of its clientele
were "transient interstate travelers" refused to open its doors to black travelers
and filed a declaratory action to challenge the constitutional validity of Title II,
the public accommodations provision of the Act, pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause, the Fifth Amendment due process clause and the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition against "involuntary servitude. 1 80 Although Congress
had invoked its power to legislate under both the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment,18 ' the Supreme Court rested its decision solely upon
the broad powers vested in Congress under the Interstate Commerce Clause:
We, therefore, conclude that the action of the Congress in the adoption
of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly serves
interstate travelers is within the power granted it by the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court for 140 years. It
may be argued that Congress could have pursued other methods to
eliminate the obstructions it found in interstate commerce caused by
racial discrimination. But this is a matter of policy that rests entirely
with the Congress not the courts. How obstructions in commerce may
be removed-what means are to be employed-is within the sound and
1 82
exclusive discretion of the Congress.

The Court avoided meeting head-on its earlier decision in the Civil Rights
Cases.1 83 In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the
177. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
178. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
179. Heartof Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 241 (1964). See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305
(1964) (ruling that Congress validly legislated under Commerce Clause to prohibit racial
discrimination in restaurants). The Court had addressed a constitutional challenge to the 1974
extension of the ADEA to governmental employers under the Tenth Amendment. See EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983) (upholding application of ADEA to state employers by balancing
state and federal interests). However, in 1985, just two years later, the Court overruled a prior
decision in which it held that the Tenth Amendment limited congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985), overruling
NatI. League 9 f Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
180. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 243-44.
181. The Senate Report accompanying the Civil Rights Act of 1964 directly addressed the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883 in which the Court struck down a substantially similar federal statute that was
based upon Section 5 power. Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 447 n. 22. The Senate Report explained:
There is a large body of legal thought that believes the Court would either reverse the earlier
decision if the question were again presented or that changed circumstances in the
intervening 80 years would make it possible for the earlier decision to be distinguished. That
question, however, was not before the committee, for the instant measure is based on the
commerce clause ... of the Constitution.

Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 88-872, at 12 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2356).
182. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261-62.
183. Id. at 250-51. The legislation under consideration in the Civil Rights Cases involved an 1875
Act of Congress prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations, such as inns and theaters. Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883). The Court found the act unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
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Court reluctantly, arguing instead that the result the Court reached was "much
more obvious as a protective measure under the Fourteenth Amendment than
under the Commerce Clause" and that
[i]t is rather my belief that the right of the people to be free of state
action that discriminates against them because of race, like the "right
of persons to move freely from State to State, occupies a more
protected position in our constitutional system than does the
movement of cattle, fruit, steel, and coal across state lines."1" 4
The Supreme Court decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel "fixed a fateful
pattern." 185 As Congress continued to legislate in this area, the Court focused
upon the decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel to uphold congressional enactments
under the Commerce Clause. 186 Three strands of recent Supreme Court
authority, however, have combined to call into question the seemingly broad
congressional power to legislate under the Commerce Clause and, as a result, the
validity of several federal employment discrimination laws. 187 First, in United
States v. Lopez 188 in 1995 and more recently in United States v. Morrison,189 the
Court struck down legislation under the Commerce Clause. 190 In each case, the
Court found the regulated activity to not be "commercial" or "economic" and
therefore not a matter of national concern. 191
In Lopez, the Court concluded that Congress did not possess the authority
to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act, legislation prohibiting the knowing
possession of a firearm in a location the individual knows or reasonably believes
to be a school zone. 192 The Court found that such possession of a gun in a local
school zone by a local individual was not an economic activity substantially
affecting interstate commerce. 193 In Morrison, the Court analyzed federal civil

Amendment specifically ruling that the Constitution could not be applied to private actors. Id. at 26.
See supra note 33 for discussion of other cases during this era. The Court in Heart of Atlanta,
distinguished the 1875 legislation and decision in the Civil Rights Cases: "Unlike Title II of the present
legislation, the 1875 Act broadly proscribed discrimination in 'inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theaters, and other places of public amusement.' without limiting the categories of affected
businesses to those impinging upon interstate commerce." 379 U.S. at 250.
184. Id. at 279 (citations omitted).
185. Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 448.
186. Id. at 448, 503-04 n.280 and cases cited therein. The authors argue that:
[T]he Court's deference to Congress helped to consolidate a new consensus about the
federal government's role in enforcing civil rights. By the end of the decade, [by the end of
the 1960s] Congress, the Court, and the American people all expected the federal
government to lead the fight against discrimination in the public and private sectors.
Id. at 501.
187. Id. at 449.
188. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
189. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
190. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
191. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598-619; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
192. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.

193. Id.
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rights legislation concerning gender-motivated violence.194
It specifically
"reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
95
commerce."1
B. Power to Abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In a second line of cases beginning in 1996, with Seminole Tribe v.
Florida,196 the Supreme Court held that legislation enacted pursuant to Article I,
as is Commerce Clause legislation, does not abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity to private damage claims in federal court. 19 In 1999, in
Alden v. Maine,198 the Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment also
prohibited Congressional action subjecting unconsenting states to private
damage claims in state court. In Alden, the Court noted that Eleventh
Amendment immunity could be validly abrogated by Congress through
legislation enacted pursuant to its Section 5, Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Clause power. 99 Thus, Congress' power pursuant to section 5 will
2°
now often determine which federal laws can validly be applied to the states.
C. Power to Legislate Under Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment
The third line of recent Supreme Court cases, not surprisingly, involve
decisions assessing congressional power to legislate under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 20 1 Beginning in 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores,20 2 the

194. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598-619.
195. Id. at 617. The Court found the congressional record insufficient in its findings of the impact

violent gender-based crimes had on interstate commerce: "by 'deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved in interstate commerce;.. . by diminishing national productivity,
increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate
products."' Id. at 615 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1853). The Court ruled that these findings were representative of the findings it
feared Congress would use to "obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority," especially given the fact that the prevention of violence has "always been the prime object
of the States' police power." Morrison,529 U.S. at 615.
196. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (deciding action by Indian tribe against state to compel negotiation under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
197. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47. This decision overruled the Court's 1989 decision in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
198. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (considering action by probation officers against state for allegedly
violating overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act). In both Seminole Tribe and Alden the
Court was closely divided and rendered a 5-4 decision with vigorous dissenting opinions. Alden, 527
U.S. at 760-814, Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 100-185. In Seminole Tribe, Justice Souter argued, "(T]he
Court today holds for the first time since the founding of the Republic that Congress has no authority
to subject a state to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a federal
right." 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting).
199. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
200. Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 451.
201. Id.
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Court ruled that Congress acted unconstitutionally when it enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 2 3 This was the first Supreme Court
2°4
decision to squarely address Congress' Section 5 power in two decades.
"Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,20 5 in which the Court
upheld against a free exercise challenge a state law of general applicability
criminalizing peyote use." 20 6 The RFRA legislation attempted to prohibit both
federal and state government from "substantially burdening" the First
Amendment Free Exercise of religion "even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden '(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
20 7
means of furthering that... interest.'
The Court ruled that Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact RFRA because although the delegation of
power to Congress to enforce Section 5 is broad, Congress lacks "the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." 208 The Court found that
because Congress enacted RFRA with an express purpose: "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, .. . and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened,"
the legislation crossed the line from enforcing the Constitution through
appropriate remedial legislation to determining its substantive content or
meaning. 20 9 The Court thus reasserted "the basic precept of Marbury [v.
Madison]: In the last instance, it is for 'the Judicial Branch... to say what the
law is."'

2 10

In determining that RFRA was not appropriate remedial legislation, the
Court applied a test of "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be

202. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
203. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36.
204. Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 452. See generally, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)
(holding Eleventh Amendment is limited by enforcement provisions of section 5 of Fourteenth
Amendment).
205. 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
206. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512 (citation omitted).
207. Id. at 515-16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2001)).
208. Id. at 519.
209. Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 453 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2001) (citing
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963))). In Boerne, the Court expressly approved several of its prior
decisions. 521 U.S. at 518 (approving City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)). The Court, however, expressly reaffirmed its decision in Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which it had rejected its earlier decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963). Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. In Sherbert, the Court applied a balancing test and held that
South Carolina could not constitutionally apply its unemployment compensation statute to deny
benefits to a claimant who had declined employment based upon her religious beliefs. 374 U.S. at 398.
210. Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 454 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
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prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. '211 The Court
concluded that the legislation was not "designed to prevent ...unconstitutional
behavior," but was rather an attempt by Congress to create "a substantive
change in constitutional protections."' 21 2 This analysis set the stage for the
Court's decisions in Kimel and Garrett.213 First, in Kimel, in 2000, the Court
applied the analytical framework utilized in Boerne to the ADEA.214 The Court
began its analysis by noting that age-based classifications are not entitled to
heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment; thus, so long as states
have a rational basis for making distinctions based upon age, such distinctions
215
will be upheld.
The Court found that this test "permits States to draw lines on the basis of
age when they have a rational basis for doing so at a class-based level, even if it
216
'is probably not true' that those reasons are valid in the majority of cases."
The Court then framed the issue presented in terms of the Boerne distinction
between remedial (permissible) legislation and substantive (impermissible)
legislation and concluded:
Judged against the backdrop of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is
clear that the ADEA is "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." The Act, through its
broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits
substantially more state employment decisions and practices than
would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal
21 7
protection, rational basis standard.
Although it clearly found disproportionality, the Court next examined the
legislative history to determine whether Congress was in fact warranted in
enacting such broad and far-reaching legislation. 21 8 The Court found the
legislative record deficient, falling "well short of the mark" in identifying "any
pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination
219
whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation."
A year later in Garrett,once again, a closely divided Court, ruled that Title I
220
of the ADA failed to pass the Boerne test of proportionality and congruence.
First, the Court looked to its earlier Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence to
support its conclusion that rational basis analysis applies to classifications based

211. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
212. Id. at 532.
213. Garrett,531 U.S. at 356; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62.
214. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83.
215. Id. at 83-84.
216. Id. at 86 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (upholding, under Equal
Protection Clause rational basis test, Missouri constitutional requirement that judges retire at age
seventy)).
217. Id. (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
218. Id. at 88-89.
219. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
220. Garrett,531 U.S. at 372.
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upon disability: "States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make
special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such
individuals are rational.
They could quite hardheadedly-and perhaps
hardheartedly-hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make
' 22
allowance for the disabled." '
The Court next analyzed the very extensive legislative record underlying the
ADA for evidence of "a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment
discrimination by the States against the disabled. '2 22 Although the Court found
evidence of such discrimination in the legislative record, it concluded that the
evidence was insufficient to support the broad scope of the ADA:
Several of these incidents undoubtedly evidence an unwillingness on
the part of state officials to make the sort of accommodations for the
disabled required by the ADA. Whether they were irrational under
our decision in Cleburne is more debatable, particularly when the
incident is described out of context. But even if it were to be
determined that each incident upon fuller examination showed
unconstitutional action on the part of the State, these incidents taken
together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional
223
discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based.
The Court also noted other evidence in the congressional record that was in
tension with a finding of a history of purposeful discrimination on the part of the
states-by the time the ADA became law, every state had laws prohibiting
discrimination based upon disability. 22 4 The Court reasoned further that even if
Congress had identified a pattern of State discrimination sufficient to support
remedial legislation, "the rights and remedies created by the ADA" far exceed
225
appropriate remedial legislation.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, POWERS, AND SETTLED EXPECTATIONS

A great deal of critical scholarship has been generated in the wake of Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents,226 Board of Trustees v. Garrett,227 and the other

221. Id.at 367-68.
222. Id. at 368.
223. Id at 370.
224. Id. at 368 & n.5. See supra note 170 and accompanying text for a discussion that while the
Court did not explicitly recognize this fact as undercutting congressional findings, it is worth noting
that the state measures are frequently less extensive in terms of the types of disabilities protected, the
duties imposed upon employers in accommodating disabled employees and applicants for
employment, and the available remedies. In fact, some states exempt state employers from coverage.
See Landau, supra note 11, at 190 (noting that "[s]ome state laws are ambiguous as to whether the
state is a covered employer at all").
225. Garrett,531 U.S. at 372. The Court focused on the statutory requirement that employers
make facilities "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;" the reasonable
accommodation requirement and undue hardship test; and the disparate impact theory of liability. Id.
at 372-73 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(5)(B), 12111(9) (1994)).
226. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
227. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).

HeinOnline -- 76 Temp. L. Rev. 818 2003

20031

UNDERVALUING INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY

recent Supreme Court pronouncements 228 concerning congressional power
under both the Eleventh 229 and Fourteenth Amendments 230 to the Constitution.
The purpose of the remainder of this article is not to join that debate directly,
but instead to assess federal employment discrimination law as applied to state
employers from a different constitutional perspective-a perspective focused
upon (1) the historical rights/powers distinction under the Constitution, (2) the
private function a state performs as an employer, (3) the increased importance of
work in the lives of individuals within our society, and (4) the settled
expectations of individuals who have been until recently protected by
longstanding federal laws and, as a result, have ordered their lives around the
protections provided by these laws. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting
opinion in Kimel, when commenting upon the questionable stare decisis effect of
the Court's 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,231 overruling seven-yearold precedent: "That principle is perverted when invoked to rely on sovereign
'232
immunity as a defense to deliberate violations of settled federal law.
This argument has particular force given the fact that the recent decisions of
the Supreme Court have been bitterly contested within the Court and have all
2 33
been rendered with five Justices in the majority and four voting in dissent.

228. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627.
647-48 (1999) (applying Boerne congruence and proportionality test to invalidate federal legislation
abrogating state sovereign immunity from patent claims). For a discussion of the waiver issue, see
supra note 18.
229. In addition to the scholarship previously cited in this article, for a small sampling of
additional research, see generally, Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Symposium, The Eleventh Amendment as
Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225 (2001); Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the
Eleventh Amendment: InternationalLaw and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1027 (2002); Ronald
D. Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett, and Protectionfor Civil Rights, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1183
(2002); Christopher E. Sherer, The Resurgence of Federalism: State Employees and the Eleventh
Amendment, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1 (2001); Mark Strasser, Hans, Ayers, and Eleventh
Amendment Jurisprudence: On Justification, Rationalization, and Sovereign Immunity. 10 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 251 (2001).
230. For a sampling of Fourteenth Amendment scholarship, see generally, Stephen E. Gottlieb,
Symposium, Rolling John Bingham in his Grave: The Rehnquist Court Makes Sport With the l4h
Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 411 (2003); Adam J. Rosen, SlaughteringSovereignty: How Congress
Can Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity to Enforce the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 11 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 111 (2001); Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Bourne v. Flores. 32
IND. L. REV. 163 (1998); Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of Constitutional Error: The Rehnquist
Court's States' Rights Assault on Fourteenth Amendment Protections of Individual Rights, 11 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 259 (2001).
231. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
232. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44 (1996)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Native American
tribes against states to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to Indian Commerce Clause), overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). For a discussion of the analysis in these cases, see
supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
233. See Shelton, supra note 18, at 838-39 (noting several close decisions over the issue of
sovereign immunity). The bitter division in the Court is evident from the tenor of the opinions.
Justice Steven's anger regarding the decision in Seminole Tribe is readily apparent: "First and

HeinOnline -- 76 Temp. L. Rev. 819 2003

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

When members of the Court hold radically different interpretations of the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment's guarantee of state sovereignty, and when
those interpretations are not textually grounded in the language of the Eleventh
Amendment, a particularly compelling argument in favor of deference to
Congress can and should be made.234 This is especially true when Congress has
acted pursuant to its Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,
which confers no rights on states, but instead vests power in Congress to enact
legislation against the states. 235 A final consideration present in both Kimel and
Garrett involves the nature of the legislation itself-in both cases, the legislation
"does not discriminate against anyone, nor does it pose any threat to basic
liberty." 236 Why then would a majority of the Court rule that state sovereignty
trumps the rights of individuals protected by the ADEA, for example, "a
statute... whose substantive mandates extend to 'elevator operators, janitors,
charwomen, security guards, secretaries, and the like in every office building in a
' 2 37
State's governmental hierarchy? '
A very basic consideration and beginning point of constitutional analysis is
its recognition of individual rights, rendering the individual sovereign over
238
certain spheres of life, while simultaneously granting powers to the states.
foremost, the reasoning of that opinion is so profoundly mistaken and so fundamentally inconsistent
with the Framers' conception of the constitutional order that it has forsaken any claim to the usual
deference or respect owed to decisions of this Court." Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97-98 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
234. The Eleventh Amendment provides that: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or in equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI. The language of the Amendment does not explicitly grant immunity from suit to
the states. Todd B. Tatelman, Comment, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs: The
Eleventh Amendment in a States' Rights Era: Sword or Shield?, 52 CATH. U.L. REV. 683, 683 & n.5
(2003). Its immediate purpose was to overrule Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See
U.S. CONST. amend. XI (invalidating the ruling in Chisolm v. Georgiathat declared that United States
citizens could sue their state governments); Chisolm, 2 U.S. at 428 (holding that United States citizen
may bring action against state government). It was not until almost a century after its ratification, that
the Supreme Court gave the Eleventh Amendment this interpretation. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (holding that Amendment was designed to incorporate concept of sovereign
immunity by which state may not be sued in federal court without its consent). Analysts argue over
three different theories of interpreting the Eleventh Amendment: (1) restricts subject matter
jurisdiction of federal courts (current majority); (2) restricts subject matter jurisdiction only in matters
of diversity jurisdiction (current dissent); (3) reinstates common law immunity of states prior to
Chisolm. Tatelman, supra, at 683 & n.5.
235. As Justice Breyer argued in his dissenting opinion in Garrett:"Rules for interpreting § 5 that
would provide States with special protection, however, run counter to the very object of the
Fourteenth Amendment. By its terms, that Amendment prohibits States from denying their citizens
equal protection of the laws." 531 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
236. Id. at 387.
237. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 99 (Thomas, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,
285 (1973)).
238. See Akhil Reed Amar, 2000 DanielJ. Meador Lecture: Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53
ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2002) (noting in Reconstruction context and passage of Fourteenth
Amendment, that individual rights are "fundamental privilege" of all American citizens); Reich, supra
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Very simply stated, the Constitution confers rights on individuals and powers on
states:
The original Constitution relied on the concept of boundaries and
limits to preserve individual sovereignty as well as on specific
guarantees of liberty such as those found in the Bill of Rights. The
principle that the national government was limited to enumerated
powers, and the principle of federalism, which left large areas of power
to the states, are both protections of liberty. Indeed, because these
a potentially
protections are structural and territorial, they afford
239
broader area for the individual than specific rights.
The next consideration is the interpretation employed by the Court today in
weighing the rights of individuals against the power of states. The Court vests
the term "power" with positive force, with authority to act; in contrast, individual
rights are often analyzed from a negative perspective-the right not to act, but to
be left alone. 240 This interpretation is not constitutionally mandated. It is Court
imposed and highly value-laden. 241 The balance is thus often struck in favor of
the state before the interests are ever weighed, and individual rights are thereby
subordinated.

242

note 1, at 1410 (arguing that Framers might have included separate article for individual rights in
Constitution if they could have foreseen "dominance of the modern corporate state").
239. Reich, supra note 1, at 1414. Some argue that states' rights must be equal to individual
rights to preserve federalism. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 912 (1994). Others believe differences mandate different
treatment of states and individuals. Id. For example, Jesse Choper argues that only individual rights
should be judicially enforced and that states are protected through the political process. Id. For an
assessment of judicial review from the perspective of whether it protects the rights of individuals, see
Ralph Ruebner, Democracy, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in the Age of Terrorism: The
Experience ofIsrael-A ComparativePerspective,31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493,493 (2003).

240. Reich, supra note 1, at 1416 (arguing for parity in assessment-individual rights should be
thought of no differently than individual power). The idea of "positive" and "negative" freedom is
deeply rooted in our history and philosophical beliefs. John Lawrence Hill, A Third Theory of Liberty:
The Evolution of Our Conception of Freedom in American Constitutional Thought, 29 HASTINGS

CONST. L.Q. 115, 116-17 (2002). In the nineteenth century, the notion of negative liberty dominated
constitutional belief: "liberty itself was conceived of as the absence of constraint and, more
particularly, the absence of government regulation." Id. at 122. Professor Hill asserts that by the late
nineteenth century, this concept began to change from simply the right of the individual to be left
alone to the belief that at times individual liberty or rights required more, that government
intervention was sometimes necessary to protect these rights. Id. at 124. Hill argues that:
[T]he Founding Fathers and, in particular, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, drew
together the diverse strands of a number of distinct, if often overlapping traditions, in
creating a theory of liberty which ties the values associated with individual selfdetermination to a conception of liberty as social balance. More specifically, liberty requires
the counter-balancing of all forms of social power, yet this attempt to create an equilibrium
of social power does not simply check power, as in negative theories of liberty, but serves to
create a social foundation for the affirmative expression and influence of groups, and
through them, persons.
Id. at 119.
241. Reich, supra note 1, at 1412 (arguing that "[i]ndividual rights have been demoted from a
'preferred' position to a 'subordinate' position, a drastic reversal of our constitutional jurisprudence").
242. See id. at 1411 (arguing that Court has not adhered to any notion of original meaning to

HeinOnline -- 76 Temp. L. Rev. 821 2003

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

In fact, Justice Breyer made an argument that the evidentiary balance was
struck in favor of the states and against protecting individuals in his dissenting
opinion in Garrett: "The Court, through its evidentiary demands, its nondeferential review, and its failure to distinguish between judicial and legislative
constitutional competencies improperly invades a power that the Constitution
assigns to Congress." 243 Justice Breyer took great issue with the majority's
conclusion ' 244that characterized the evidence of state discrimination as
"minimal."
Breyer found the congressional record extensive: Congress held
hearings in every state over a three-year period, "attended by more than 30,000
people," 245 and found "hundreds of instances" 246 of state discrimination against
the disabled:
instances in which a person with a disability found it impossible to
obtain a state job, to retain state employment, to use the public
transportation that was readily available to others in order to get to
work, or to obtain a public education, which is often a prerequisite to
obtaining employment. State-imposed barriers also frequently made it
difficult or impossible for people to vote, to enter a public building, to
access important government services,
such as calling for emergency
247
assistance, and to find a place to live.
The majority in Garrett also took issue, however, with the weight of the
evidence presented to Congress because it found this evidence insufficient to
prove discrimination in court.248 Not only does this analysis fail to recognize

Congress' constitutional competency, it places a nearly impossible burden on
Congress pursuant to its Section 5 authority to enact legislation protecting
individuals from discrimination-the burden of gathering evidence sufficient to
support a finding of disparate treatment in a court of law. 24 9 The high failure
rate of employment discrimination claims in the court system is evidence of the
difficulty this burden of proof places upon an individual litigant; when this same
burden is placed upon Congress' shoulders to justify national legislation that is
250
not subject to heightened scrutiny, it becomes almost insurmountable.
In order to meaningfully assess the rights of individuals in the workplace
and the corresponding power of states as employers, the realities of the modern
day work setting should also be recognized. 251 The distinction between the
interpret governmental power, but has adhered closely to traditional meanings of individual rights,
thereby creating "Unbalanced Constitution").
243. Garrett,531 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

244. Id. at 377.
245. Id. at 377.
246. Id. at 379.
247. Id.
248. Garrett,531 U.S. at 379.

249. Id. at 380.
250. See Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries-AppellateReview of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts,

1989 Wis. L. REV. 237, 249-50 (giving statistics about relative frequency of reversal on appeal of
employment discrimination cases in contrast to other types of civil cases because of high legal standard
for proving liability).
251. See Reich, supra note 1, at 1423-34. Reich argues that:
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private and public sector in employment has become blurred and meaninglesslarge corporations have become highly organized and operate like governmental
organizations, often wielding power indistinguishable from that traditionally
vested in government. 252 The growth of the administrative state, as it is often
termed, frequently results in policymaking "between unelected administrators, a
' 253
few interested politicians, and representatives of the affected industries."
Governments, in turn, particularly when acting as employers, are
indistinguishable from large corporate entities.2 54 In this setting, one in which
the government is performing a private function, and wielding enormous power
over the lives of individual employees, the state action doctrine loses its
255
meaning.
Yet from a constitutional perspective, this public-private distinction
undermines the individual employee because state employers are permitted to
"claim a special public interest in their employment practices so as to deny public
employees rights they would have as private employees." 256 And now, with the
rulings in Kimel and Garrett, state employers are not subject to the same legal
standards and sanctions in their treatment of disabled and older workers and
applicants for employment as are private employers.
Another reality of the modern day work setting is its social, emotional, and
economic importance to individuals. 257 Indeed, "[flor most of us, attachment to
the work force is both a financial necessity and a sign of one's worth socially and
politically.

Employment lies . . . at the very core of modern democratic

citizenship. The person who does not work and is expected to work is socially
'258
and politically stigmatized.
Exclusion or the potential for exclusion from an entire class of job

Today, in contrast, America is territorially divided into an "inside" and an "outside." Most
people spend a major portion of their lives within a system or organization, public or private.
This inside territory is governed by different rules and principles than those prevailing on the
traditional outside. A corporation or government agency is not a democracy. It is governed
from the top. Workers are not full citizens. They do not vote; instead, they take orders. On
the inside, there are no courts, no Bill of Rights, no legislature, no system of law, no
principle of equality.
Id. at 1423-24.

252. Id. at 1424.
253. Hill, supra note 240, at 134. Hill explains:

[W]hile the growth of the administrative state is typically viewed as a tradeoff of indirect
political control by the citizenry in return for expertise, efficiency and coverage ... there can
be no doubt that the administrative state represents virtually the opposite end of the
philosophical spectrum from that of the polis, from the standpoint of a commitment to
positive liberty.
Id.
254. Reich, supra note 1, at 1429.

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Mark Neal Aaronson. Ideas Matter: A Review of John Denvir's Democracy's Constitution,36

U.S.F. L. REV. 937.949 (2002).
258. Id.

HeinOnline -- 76 Temp. L. Rev. 823 2003

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

opportunities-those with a state as employer-is especially troubling. It must
be remembered that the Supreme Court did not base its decisions in Kimel and
Garretton the idea that the states might be held to a higher standard than private
employers. By its decisions, the Court declared that states will be held to a lesser
standard in the employment arena than are private employers. 259 The Court's
decision has grave ramifications. In some sense, the Court has decreed that a
state system of excluding individuals who have historically been denied
productive, fulfilling work lives, is now constitutionally permissible. 26° This is
not to say that states will engage in discrimination with impunity, but the
261
message the decisions themselves send should not be underestimated.
When these recent Supreme Court decisions are placed side-by-side with
the Court's prior jurisprudence in this area, an odd tapestry emerges. In other
aspects of federal regulation of the states as employers, the Court has recognized
that "Congress' power to regulate the American economy includes the power to
regulate both the public and the private sectors of the labor market. '262 For
instance, Congress is permitted to regulate the states by establishing uniform
minimum wage laws, federal employee benefit and pension laws, tax laws, and
fair labor standards rate-setting laws. 263 Yet, it is not permitted to impose
important aspects of employment discrimination laws upon the states when the
protected class involves age, or physical or mental disability.264 The Supreme
Court's conclusion that state sovereignty trumps individual rights to be fully
compensated for arbitrary and discriminatory treatment in the employment
265
setting makes no sense when the state is engaging in a private function.
This result is especially problematic given the fact that federal employment
259. Garrett,531 U.S. at 387-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 388.
261. See Reich, supra note 1,at 1438-39 (noting that our economy consists of centralized "inside"
where small few make majority of decisions, and "outside" where those excluded cannot affect their
own fate or achieve their desire to be on "inside" without help of "inside" decisionmakers). Reich
characterizes the working sector as the "inside" and those who are excluded from it as being on the
"outside:"

The phenomenon of exclusion has escaped adequate analysis and understanding because we
comfort ourselves with the belief that it is a voluntary deprivation; that anyone who wants to
contribute work may find a place on the inside through her own efforts and that those who
are on the outside are responsible for their own condition. This belief represents a lag in our
consciousness, the clinging to a mythology we desperately want to believe. Layoffs, plant
closings, the existence of a permanently excluded socioeconomic class, the fate of neglected
children, and the uncared-for aged tell a different story.
Id. at 1439.
262. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92-93 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
263. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (upholding
application of Fair abor Standards Act overtime and minimum wage requirements to public mass
transit employer), overrulingNat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
264. Garrett,531 U.S. at 360; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91-92.
265. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543-44. See also Wally Mueller, Controversial Programming on Cable
Television's Public Access Channels: The Limits of Governmental Response, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051,

1110-11 (1989) (arguing that nonprofit access management corporations that exercise control over
public airwaves are state actors).
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discrimination laws protect most within society in one form or another for their
entire career; these laws have become socially accepted and expected. 266 In
other areas of constitutional analysis, members of the Court have recognized
that when longstanding laws exist, which confer individual rights, people order
267
their lives around the expectation that the rights will not be taken from them.
The expectation of uniform, national protection of civil rights in the employment
setting should not be cast aside by such narrow margins:
One cannot reason about the scope of the national government's
authority to enforce civil rights without addressing the history of the
second Reconstruction, which profoundly altered the federal
government's role in combating discrimination. That history is now
institutionalized in judicial precedents, congressional enactments, and
executive agencies. It has been incorporated into the common sense
and experience of the country. 268
V. CONCLUSION

Federal employment discrimination law has become the primary vehicle by
which individuals pursue relief from discrimination in employment. For four
decades federal legislation has provided a uniform system of rights and remedies,
one that the Supreme Court has very recently fundamentally altered.
Individuals have come to expect national protection from discrimination in
employment based upon race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age, and
disability, and there exists no good reason, constitutional or otherwise, for
undermining this settled expectation for two sources of protection-disability
and age. Certainly, a justification grounded in state sovereignty should not
disturb these settled expectations around which people have ordered their lives.
The need to exercise judicial restraint is especially critical when the Court is so
bitterly yet so closely divided upon the issue of state sovereignty and when the
legislation it thwarts prohibits the states in their capacity as employers from

266. See Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 485-86 (noting that employment relationship today "now
appears.., a sphere of 'national' regulatory concern").
267. For example, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
853 (1992), Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concluded that the doctrine of stare decisis should be
observed and that the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), recognizing abortion rights should
not be overturned: "arguments which in their ultimate formulation conclude that Roe should be
overruled, the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are
outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare
decisis." See also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714 (1995) (stating "[s]tare decisis has
special force when legislators or citizens 'have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this
instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive
legislative response' (quoting Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197,202 (1991))).
The Court, however, in Hubbard found the reliance interest on precedent "notably modest." Id. at
714. In a series of other due process decisions, the Court has similarly declared that Congress does not
possess "unlimited power to 'readjust rights and burdens... and upset otherwise settled
expectations."' United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 37 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,229 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
268. Post & Siegel, supra note 58, at 486.

HeinOnline -- 76 Temp. L. Rev. 825 2003

826

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

practicing invidious discrimination against individuals based upon traits or
characteristics essentially unrelated to the ability to perform a job.
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